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Notes
Access of the Poor to Basic Economic Needs:
A New Concern in Freedom of Speech Decisions
The Supreme Court has recently expanded .the right of consumers to
receive relevant product information by ruling that "commercial
speech," information that concerns only financial transactions, is pro-
tected by the first amendment.' While commercial speech was formerly
considered to be distinct from traditionally protected speech, which is the
discussion of political, social and moral issues, the Court has ruled that
commercial speech is protected because its content may be as important
to a consumer as any political or moral debate, and because society has
strong interest in knowing who is selling what products or services and
for what price. Commercial information facilitates access to goods and
services, particularly for the poor, who need to know where the lowest
priced items may be found. The Court has recognized that society,
especially the poor, may suffer from restrictions on advertising more
than from its possible side effects such as fraud or reduction in quality of
goods and services due to aggressive competition.
The right to commercial information is not the same as the right to
goods and services. Courts normally decline to invalidate statutes merely
because they limit or deny goods and services to certain people. But in
the cases invalidating state restrictions on advertising, the Supreme
Court has shown a strong concern for the poor's access to basic needs,
such as prescription drugs and legal services, which suggests that
statutes interfering with such access are more likely to be invalidated
than would statutes not concerning the poor or important needs. The
Court's attitude in these cases runs against the traditional judicial
restraint applied to social and economic legislation. This Note will ex-
amine the ways in which these economic concerns appear in the profes-
sional advertising cases, and how they may affect future constitutional
decisions in which basic economic needs are involved.
THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
LEGISLATION
When legislation restricting necessities such as welfare, food or hous-
ing is challenged on due process or equal protection grounds, the Court's
response is ordinarily to place the statute under the category of "social
and economic legislation," and apply the standard of minimum scrutiny,
under which the legislation need only be an arguably rational means of
achieving a legitimate end to be constitutional.2 The primary justifica-
'See, eg., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
2For example, the court continues to use the standard of minimum rationality in dealing with
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tion for this approach is that the legislature needs a wide degree of
latitude in order to effectively deal with social and economic problems.
Accordingly, the Court should not sit as a "superlegislature,"
substituting its views for the judgment of those elected to pass laws, or
insisting that statutes be the best means of solving the problems with
which they purport to deal.3
A leading case which utilized this approach with a statute involving
basic needs of the poor is Dandridge v. Williams.' In Dandridge, the
Court upheld against an equal protection challenge a Maryland regula-
tion setting an upper limit on benefits a family may receive under the Aid
to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program.5 The District
Court held that the regulation was invalid for "overreaching" because it
burdened a large number of recipients to which it did not expressly
apply.6 The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stewart found the concept
of "overreaching" inappropriate as a means of invalidating economic and
social legislation, preferring to limit the doctrine to cases involving a
challenge to the statute based on the first amendment or on other
"freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."' 7 The result was a hands-off
acceptance of the regulation as a rational means for carrying out the
alleged state purposes of "encouraging employment" and "avoiding
discrimination between welfare families and the families of the working
poor,"" even though the Court did not dispute the charge that many
welfare recipients were suffering because the regulation limited their
benefits. The Court's position was that the task of devising welfare
systems belonged to the legislature.
Justice Stewart recognized that the category of "economic and social"
fourteenth amendment challenges to government disability benefit statutes. See, e.g., Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
3E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
4397 U.S. 471 (1970).
142 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970). Plaintiffs had argued that the statute violated the equal protec-
tion clause by discriminating against children in larger families, who received fewer benefits per
child than those in smaller families.
6Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968,) rev'd, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The
legislative purposes advanced in the lower court were (1) discouraging desertion by wage earners,
(2) encouraging the surviving parent to seek employment, and (3) promoting planned parenthood.
The court found that even if the legislation advanced these purposes, it adversely affected all
AFDC eligibles in families over a certain size-particularly the children, to whom these purposes
did not apply--and thus was invalid for sweeping too broadly. Id at 474-75.
'397 U.S. at 484. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), invalidating two states'
one-year waiting periods for AFDC claimants, on grounds that they violated the constitutional
right to interstate travel; Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), striking
down, as an infringement on the right to travel, Arizona's one-year county residence requirement
for eligibility for free medical care granted to indigents by statute. But cf Tribe, Unraveling Na-
tional League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Eventual Government Ser-
vices, 90 HARv.L. REV. 1065 (1977). The "right to travel" basis for these decisions is questioned,
and an underlying "right to welfare" and "right to nonemergency medical services" is suggested as
a partial explanation. Id at 1079-80. Certain language in Maricopa County supports this position:
"[Miedical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance. And,
governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being
of greater constitutional significance than less essential forms of government entitlements." 415
U.S. at 259. But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
'397 U.S. at 486.
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legislation usually concerns regulation of business and industry,9 while
the administration of welfare "involves the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings."' 10 Nevertheless, the importance of welfare
in itself was not sufficient to alter the degree of scrutiny of the statute, or
to elevate welfare to the level of rights which, under an equal protection
analysis, must be provided equally for all beneficiaries once the state has
decided to provide them in the first place."
Dandridge thus represented a defeat for the argument that because the
poor are affected most by a restriction, or because a need as important as
welfare is at stake, the statute deserves more than minimum scrutiny.
The sharp line drawn between cases involving "social and economic"
legislation and those involving personal liberties such as first amend-
ment rights ensured that the Maryland legislature would be free to ex-
periment in this area of public welfare, but many of those intended to be
aided by the AFDC program suffered as a result.
The minimum scrutiny standard associated with "social and
economic" legislation was also applied in the field of prescription drug
advertising. In Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery,1 a Virginia statute pro-
hibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices 13 was
challenged by a retail drug center, primarily on due process and equal
protection grounds. The District Court upheld the statute, ruling that as
dispensing of prescription drugs is a service that relies heavily on the pro-
fessional skills of pharmacists in order to protect public health, 4 the
statute falls into the category of "social and economic" legislation."5 Pat-
'This point was emphasized by Marshall's dissent:
This case, involving the literally vital interests of a powerless minority-poor families
without breadwinners-is far removed from the area of business regulation, as the
Court concedes. Why then is the standard used in those cases imposed here? We are
told no more than that this case falls in 'the area of economics and social welfare,'
with the implication that from there the answer is obvious.
Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
10Id& at 485.
"See, eg., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Il-
linois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to criminal appeal-free transcripts for indigent defendants);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to criminal appeal-free counsel for indigent
defendants). But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Note that the Court has rejected the pro-
position that constitutional rights to welfare depend upon whether benefits to a particular recipient
are considered a "right" or a "privilege." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
12305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
"VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1950) provided that "any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of un-
professional conduct who ... (3) publishes, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee,
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms.., for any drugs which may be dispensed only by
prescription."
14Pharmacists must have extensive knowledge of a wide range of drugs. Accuracy
is essential; mistakes can be serious. A few prescriptions, but nevertheless a signifi-
cant number, cannot be filled from drugs available in manufactured form, so the
medicine must be compounded by the pharmacists. Some pharmacists, probably a
minority, systematically monitor prescriptions by family records to avoid allergic
reactions or the simultaneous use of antagonistic drugs, of which the patient's doctor
may not be aware.
305 F. Supp. at 824.
"The case was accordingly ruled by the minimum rationality standards of Williamson v. Lee Op.
19781
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terson contained no mention of how the poor could gain greater access to
necessities through advertising, other than a single reference to the an-
ticompetitive effect of the ban. 16 Like Dandridge, the Patterson court
avoided speculation as to how much of the basic need the poor ought to
have, leaving all consideration of less burdensome restrictions to the
legislature.
THE PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING CASES
In addition to upholding the statute on fourteenth amendment
grounds, Patterson rejected a claim by the drugstore that the advertising
ban infringed on pharmacists' rights of freedom of speech, finding that
advertising was unprotected "commercial speech.' ' 7 But five years later,
the same statute was successftilly challenged on first amendment
grounds. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Counci, Inc., 8 consumers of prescription drugs maintained that
the state, by prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prices, violated
their right to know this information. 9 The District Court enjoined the
defendants from enforcing the statute,2 0 and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Blackmun observed that since the time Patterson had been decid-
ed, the principle that commercial speech should not be protected had
been greatly weakened. 21 Even if vestiges of the doctrine remained, there
was an important distinction between the challenge by the drugstore and
the present attack by consumers. The former was based on a "prima facie
commercial approach,' '2 while the latter contained a health interest in ac-
cess to information about drug prices that was "fundamentally deeper
than a trade consideration."' 23 The first amendment was held to protect
the consumer's right as a recipient of this information, rather than as a
tical of Okla., Inc., 384 U.S. 483 (1955), and Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294
U.S. 608 (1935). These cases sustained, respectively, statutes forbidding solicitation of the sale of
eyeglass frames and advertising of the price of dental work.
16305 F. Supp. at 825-26.
"The Court relied on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which had recognized
commercial advertising as a distinct class of speech outside First Amendment protection.
"8425 U.S. 748 (1976).
"The first amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
"Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Va. 1974), afrd, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
"Id. at 755, quoting Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy,
373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974).
"In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court reversed a conviction of a
newspaper editor for running an advertisement of a New York abortion placement service,
on First Amendment grounds. The Court reasoned that the advertisement was truly a
matter of "public interest," protected by the First Amendment, as it extended to readers
with a general interest in the subject matter and how another state dealt with it, and to
those seeking reform in Virginia. However, it was arguable that Valentine, supra note 17,
still applied to advertisements stating nothing more than "I will sell you the X prescrip-
tion drug at the Y price." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
1Id. Note that the lower court decision, with its emphasis on the identity of the plaintiffs
as consumers, preceded the Bigelow "commercial speech" decision by a year.
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speaker,24 a right that under a typical first amendment balancing ap-
proach outweighed the state interest in protecting the health of its
citizens.
25
One year later, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"6 the Court extended
the first amendment holding of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to the
legal profession. This case arose when two attorneys placed an advertise-
ment in a newspaper, listing prices of certain legal services, in violation of
an Arizona disciplinary rule.27 The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the rule,28 but the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the state may not prohibit attorneys from adver-
tising the prices of routine legal services.
Justice Blackmun noted that certain differences in the nature of the
professions had caused the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to
limit its holding to the pharmaceutical profession. 29 Yet the Court used
reasoning similar to that of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy its first
amendment decision in Bates. The potential customers of the legal clinic,
people of modest means who needed inexpensive legal services but who
did not qualify for government legal aid, had an important interest in
price information. The ban on advertising, by inhibiting the flow of com-
mercial information and keeping the public in ignorance, violated the con-
sumer's right-to-know under the first amendment, and could not be
justified by the state interest in the welfare of its citizens.30
The right-to-know doctrine does not in itself imply that a greater con-
stitutional significance should be attached to basic economic needs of the
poor; it still might be distinguished as a personal freedom wholly outside
the category of "economic and social" interests. But economic concerns
guided the Court in its first amendment balancing test. These concerns
""Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the
case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its reci-
pients both." Id at 756. It has been said that the right to receive information is a
necessary, though often overlooked complement to the right to speak or publish. See, e.g.
American Meat Inst. v. Ball, 424 F. Supp. 758, 767-68 (1976). It has also been said that the
state itself has its own rights of free speech, with respect to the federal government, in
order to make available to consumers such information it believes to be in their best in-
terests. Ic& at 770 (dicta).
"Those interests were argued to be (1) protecting pharmacists' professional services,
such as compounding, handling, and dispensing of prescription drugs from erosion by ag-
gressive price competition, and (2) preventing the loss of "stable pharmacist-customer
relationships," and of pharmacist monitoring of customers to assure that customers take
the proper drugs as they shop around forthe lowest prices. Blackmun found these goals
"highly paternalistic," and "on close inspection... rest[ing] in large measure on the advan-
tages of [consumers] being kept in ignorance." 425 U.S. at 769.
26433 U.S. 350 (1977).
27D.R. 2-101(B), 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. Sup. CT. RULEs. rule 29 (a) (Supp. 1976).
"Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), rev'd 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29 Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions,
historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration of
quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense
standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion
and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
425 U.S. at 773 n. 25.
"The justifications the Court dealt with were (1) the adverse effect on professionalism,
1978)
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can be broken down into three components. The first two deal with the
consumer's interest: the class of consumers affected most severely by the
advertising restrictions, and the importance to that class of the goods
and services themselves. The third involves the balancing process itself:
the fact that these economic concerns outweighed the state interest in
protecting the public against the dangers of professional advertising.
In both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates, the Court ex-
pressed a high level of concern for the poor, and for their interest in better
access to price information. In each case, the Court scrutinized the role
advertising plays in allocating goods and services in our economic
system, and recognized that consumers, particularly the poor, were
burdened by restrictions on commercial information. The Court went on
to suggest that the free flow of information could improve the position of
the poor by allowing them to compare prices and make informed deci-
sions, and by lowering prices through increased competition.3 1 The poor
would be in a more competitive position in the market with the rest of
society, and thus a measure of wealth redistribution would be ac-
complished by the free enterprise system. This is especially important in
Bates, for greater participation by the poor in the legal system could
serve to advance their interests in other areas of society.
This suggests that the distinction between "personal" and "economic"
liberties is not nearly as rigid in the professional advertising cases as it
was in Dandridge. The poor, ignored by the legislature, were helped by
the Supreme Court in obtaining an economic gain. The rationale of the
professional advertising cases supports the proposition that the Court
should scrutinize legislation more closely when basic economic needs of
the poor are involved.
THE IMPACT ON THE POOR OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun, noting that a
consumer's interest in price information may be greater than his interest
(2) the inherently misleading effect of attorney advertising, (3) the adverse effect on the ad-
ministration of justice, (4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising, (5) the adverse
effect on the quality of service, and (6) the difficulties of enforcement.
31 Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be in-
telligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is indispensable.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. See also ic at 754 n. 11; id at 765-66 n. 20
(Federal Trade Commission study concluded that lifting drug price advertising bans would
save consumers millions of dollars per year). In Bates, Justice Blackmun suggested that
the same would be true for services such as those offered by attorneys:
The ban on advertising serves to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest-cost
seller of acceptable ability. As a result, to this extent attorneys are isolated from com-
petition, and the incentive to price competitively is reduced. Although it is true that
the effect of advertising on the price of services has not been demonstrated, there is
revealing evidence with regard to products; where consumers have the benefit of
[Vol. 54:83
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in important political or moral issues, stated that
[t]hose whom the suppression of prescription drug price information
hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on
prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping
from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best
spent. When drug prides vary as strikingly as they do, information as
to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could
mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic
necessities.
32
Of the three groups seen as primary victims of the advertising ban, one,
the poor, was also mentioned by Blackmun in Bates:
Among the reasons for [the] underutilization [of lawyers] is fear of the
cost....Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged problem:
advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for
a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and
terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to
burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and
the unknowledgable.
33
Thus the interest of the poor in the lifting of the prohibition is ultimately
an interest in lower prices for prescription drugs and legal services. But
once the Court begins speaking in terms of access to an economic benefit
in a constitutional decision, it subjects itself to the criticism that it is
legislating social policy. Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, claimed that the majority's concern for the
poor and their right to know price information was a facade for judicial
legislation.3 4 The majority's language, in other words, is not consistent
with the position taken in cases like Dandridge, that the legislature is the
proper body to be examining the merits of the free market system and
determining where government regulation is needed.
price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be
without advertising.
433 U.S. at 377.
3425 U.S. at 763-64.
"433 U.S. at 376-77. The reference to the "not-quite poor" assumes that the poorest potential
clients have access to government legal aid, an assumption that, despite noticeable gains by legal
services programs in the last decade, is not particularly accurate. See H. STUMPF. COMMUNITY
POLITICS AND LEGAL SERVICES-THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LAW 267-81 (1975). Even assuming such
access, however, the emphasis in the Bates approach remains on how the least well-off potential
clients of private legal offices stand to gain the most from price advertising.
31The court speaks of the consumer's interest in the free flow of commerical information, par-
ticularly in the case of the poor, the sick, and the aged ... [and] of the importance in a
'predominantly free enterprise economy' of intelligent and well-informed decisions as to the alloca-
tion of resources .... While there is... much to be said for the Court's observation as a matter of
desirable public policy, there is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires
the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating
the pharmacy profession.
425 U.S. at 783-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Brief for Appellants at 18, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), which argues that the only real difference between Patterson and Virginia Board of Phar-
macy was who was suing, and that to rule in favor of the consumers was to overturn Patterson's
Fourteenth Amendment decision as well as its First Amendment holding.
1978]
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In Virginia State Board of' Pharmacy and Bates, the Court was con-
cerned not only with the class most affected by the restrictions, but also
with what many of these poor consumers were being denied. In both
cases, the information dealt with goods and services that were important
to consumers--drugs and legal services. It is difficult to imagine the
Court showing such a concern for the poor if the information had involv-
ed less essential items such as cigarettes and alcohol.3 5 But if the impor-
tance of a consumer item is to be taken into account in free speech deci-
sions, the Court is faced with making moral or philosophical judgments
as to the importance of other important goods and services. It also risks
implications that the poor have a constitutional right to certain basic
necessities, which the Court has been careful to avoid in prior cases such
as Dandridge.
BALANCING THE CONSUMER'S INTEREST AGAINST THE STATE'S
INTEREST
The balancing process in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates
is significant because economic factors were prominent in evaluating the
weight of both the consumer's and State's interests. For example, in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court found the State's
arguments in favor of the restriction "paternalistic" because they in-
terfered with economic decision-making by consumers.3 6
A clear example of the Court's preference of the consumer's right to
know commercial information over the State's protective interests was in
Bates, in which the Court used economic arguments counteract serious
objections raised by the dissent about attorney price advertising.
'Yet the Court might be forced to differentiate among the various items being advertised in order
to uphold restrictions on less essential or dangerous items. Justice Rehnquist feared such a line
could be drawn under the majority's analysis.
Both Congress and state legislatures have by law sharply limited the permissible
dissemination of information about some commodities because of the potential harm
resulting from those commodities, even though they were not thought to be sufficient-
ly demonstrably harmful to warrant outright prohibition of their sale. Current pro-
hibitions on television advertising of liquor and cigarettes are prominent in this
category, but apparently under the Court's holding so long as the advertisements are
not deceptive they may no longer be prohibited.
Id at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).See, e.g., Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nora, Captiol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Atty. Gen., 405 U.S. 1000(1972), upholding the constitutionality of the ban on cigarette television and radio commercials,
under the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). The majority in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy distinquished this case as one involving "special problems of the elec-
tronic broadcast media," 425 U.S. at 773, but the majority's emphasis on the importance of access
to information, albeit commercial, appears to be in harmony with the Capitol Broadcasting dissent-
"[No decisions] serve as precedent for the use of Government power to shut off debate on a vital
public issue. If the First Amendment means anything at all, it means that Congress lacks this
power. There is no constitutional warrant for Government censorship of any medium of com-
munication." 333 F. Supp. at 591 (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent went on to address
the problem as one of whether the commercial speech doctrine applied, but once that doctrine was
eliminated in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the issue becomes one of "why prescription drugs, not
cigarettes?" rather than "why television and radio, and not other forms of media?"
6See generally 425 U.S. at 766-70.
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Perhaps the most significant objection was that the majority
underestimated the difficulties in advertising services. The dissent
argued that it is extremely difficult for the professional to accurately
determine in advance what the value of his time, efforts and expertise
will be to a prospective client, and any attempt to put a price tag on his
services would be misleading.37 For the same reason, it is difficult to
create a category of "routine" services in which price advertising is
reasonably accurate, or is able to deal with the problem of unanticipated
issues that might enter into a "routine" case after the lawyer begins
work, consuming more of his time than was justified by the price.38
The majority in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy found that the
advertising of prescription drug prices is not inherently misleading to the
customer.3 9 But Virginia State Board of Pharmacy applied only to drug
price advertising. This appeared to be based largely on the premise that
what was being regulated was advertisement of tangible goods, not per-
sonal servicesA0 Three justices who stood with the majority in that case'
dissented in Bates primarily on this issue, arguing that the State interest
in Bates was sufficient to overcome the consumer's interest in price
advertising. The majority did not dispute that the state maintains broad
regulatory powers over the profession,4' but they chose to view the pro-
blem of pricing discretionary services as one best handled by the lawyers
themselves.4 2 The reason was that it was more important that people who
need these "routine" services have full access to them, by being informed
of the prices attorneys were offering, than it was for the public to be pro-
tected from possible hardships due to miscalculation of what they would
need to spend on a lawyer. The result was that the Court did not engage
in the same depth of analysis in meeting this problem as it had in discuss-
ing the role of advertising in aiding access to basic necessities. 43
37433 U.S. at 394-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38433 U.S. 391-94 (Powell, J., dissenting).
9The court noted, of course, that the State may restrict advertising that is actually false, decep-
tive or misleading, and found that these rulings should not impede the State's or the Bar's efforts to
insure that advertising flow "both cleanly and freely." 433 U.S. at 383-84. See also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976).
'his was emphasized in Justice Burger's concurrence. After noting the majority's observation
that about 95% of prescriptions are filled with dosage units prepared by the manufacturer, rather
than by the pharmacist, he added that
[olur decision today, therefore, deals largely with the State's power to prohibit phar-
macists from advertising the retail price of prepackaged drugs... [Q]uite different
factors would govern were we were faced with a law regulating or even prohibiting
advertising by the traditional learned professions of medicine or law... Attorneys
and physicians are engaged primarily in providing services in which professional
judgment is a large component, a matter very different from the retail sale of labeled
drugs already prepared by others.
425 U.S. at 774 (Burger, J., concurring). See also note n. 29 supra.
"See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
"But see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 395-96 (Powell, J., dissenting), which argues
that the problem has in fact usually been left to the profession.
'
3For example, the majority's assurance that pricing problems can generally be solved at the in-
itial consultation does not deal with the problem of issues that arise or become more complex after-
1978]
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THE IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING
CASES
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates were first
amendment cases, the Court's concerns for the poor's access to basic
economic needs helped erode the distinction between "personal" and
"economic" liberties. The issue now is how far the Court will go to find
"other freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" in order to invalidate
"economic and social" legislation that would otherwise withstand con-
stitutional challenges.
In the first place, Justice Rehnquist's opposition to the "impact on the
poor" language was in part based on disfavor of the right-to-know doc-
trine itself," but he also raised the question of how much the Court was
influenced by economic policy in reaching a first amendment decision.
The right-to-know doctrine as applied to consumers generally would have
been sufficient to determine the outcome, in light of the previous weaken-
ing of the commercial speech doctrine," so that the "impact on the poor"
language, with its implications of concern for what the poor ought to
have, was unnecessary. Yet the language appears in both cases, to em-
phasize how important it is that price information flow as freely as possi-
ble. When this is combined with the Court's examination of the role
advertising plays in economic decision-making, it is difficult to draw a
sharp line between these decisions and cases like Dandridge in which
what is being sought is an economic benefit.4 For example, the state
could attack the problem of the poor's access to prescription drugs by
providing a form of direct relief, but it is questionable whether the fact
that it has not done so should affect a first amendment holding.
Second, evaluation of the importance to society of the goods or services
being advertised is usually a legislative function. But it does make sense
wards. Also questionable is the Court's refusal to deal with the question of whether assertions of
professional qualifications or suggestive slogans such as "at the lowest prices" are permissible, and
how to determine when such assertions have taken place. This might also be a problem in the
advertising of drugs; for example it is unclear whether the advertising slogans-"'Every Day is Sav-
ings Day on Everything at Revco" and "America's only Total Discount Drug Chain"-prohibited
by the Virginia statute in Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821,823 (W.D. Va. 1969),
would be permissible even after Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy and Bates.
'At one point he referred to it as "the second class First Amendment rights which the Court has
today created in commercial speech." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. at 786. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4'Perhaps the ruling could have arisen from the inherent difficulties in determining whether or
not the message carries "social import." See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
"For example, what the plaintiffs in Dandridge were really seeking were more welfare benefits.
The State presently computed the family's standard of need according to the number of children
and other economic circumstances. The upper limit, however, was imposed on families regardless
of the standard of need. Due to the size of plaintiffs' families, the standard of need substantially ex-
ceeded the upper limit. See generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1970). Yet had
plaintiffs prevailed on the grounds that the regulation unconstitutionally discriminated against
large families, Maryland could conceivably eliminate the family upper limit and reduce the stan-
dard of need for all recipients, in order to keep the program operating at the same budget level The
result would be that smaller families would be made poorer by the constitutional ruling.
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that the Court is more concerned that the poor have access to prescrip-
tion drugs and legal services than to less essential commodities and ser-
vices. The problem here is the possible effect on other decisions when im-
portant needs are at stake. For example, if the Court is affected in con-
stitutional decisions by notions of what disadvantaged people ought to
have, there is no reason why the impact will be limited to challenges to
government restrictions on free enterprise, and not affect decisions in
which the poor are claiming the right to "the enjoyment of basic
necessities" through government benefits.
The importance given to basic needs might also create problems for the
Court in cases where the "personal" freedom claim is weak. For example,
if welfare benefits were restricted to a certain group of poor people, the
Court, influenced by the fact that limiting welfare may mean cutbacks in
food, clothing, quality of housing, and health care, might find the restric-
tion unconstitutional, as long as plaintiffs could advance some kind of
"personal" liberty argument against the restriction.
Finally, if the state's protective interest is less important than access
to commercial information, the states might be hindered in their efforts
to restrict the use of potentially dangerous items. The state's protective
interest may be stronger for the poor than for the rest of society, but it is
possible that the Court might label it "paternalistic" and insist that free
access to the information, and even to the goods or services themselves,
is the best way to "protect" the poor.
Justice Rehnquist's approach is to avoid these problems by refusing to
allow a free speech decision to be influenced by concerns for access to
goods or services. 47 But such an approach seems harsh in the case of a
disadvantaged person who finds it truly difficult to obtain price informa-
tion without the help of advertisements. 48 The Dandridge minimal
scrutiny approach is likewise harsh to the disadvantaged person who is
not protected by the legislative process.
The proper approach in such cases is an "intermediate" degree of
scrutiny of statutes that restrict access to important needs of the poor.
The Court may be doing this already by an increased willingness to find
other constitutional violations, which increases the probability that a
statute will receive close scrutiny. One example of such a test is found in
state cases which, prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, invalidated
statutes forbidding drug price advertising under the requirement that
7For example, instead of reasoning that the more important the right, the more important it is to
have access to information about it, Rehnquist suggested that "[alppellees who have felt so strongly
about their right to receive information.., must also have enough residual interest in the matter to
call their pharmacy and inquire." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41This was emphasized in Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp.
267 (E.D. Va. 1976), which held, on the authority of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, that the State
may not prohibit physicians from printing information of fees and services in a medical directory.
The court found that the fact that plaintiffs could get the information from physicians personally
did not extinguish the first amendment challenge, and pointed out that many people, particularly




the statute have a substantial relationship to the goal of public health.49
Another is the equal protection approach of the dissent in Dandridge,
which takes into account the importance of the benefit being restricted or
denied to the class being discriminated against.50 A third approach in-
volves an examination of the relationship between the legislature's actual
purpose and the means, rather than permitting the state of Court itself to
argue a variety of conceivable purposes.5 1
The Court should not bend too far to find infringements of "personal"
liberties in challenges of social and economic legislation, or it is arguably
delegating legislative powers to itself. This can be avoided if it sticks to
personal infringements that are clearly defined. The "right-to-know" doc-
trine has a sound independent basis, so that it does not amount to a
facade for a true fourteenth amendment challenge.52 Whether the Court
will continue to show concern for the poor in other "personal" liberty
cases remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
The Court's approach to due process or equal protection challenges to
economic and social legislation remains one of deference to the
legislature. In order for such legislation to be constitutional, "[i]t is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to cor-
rect it." '53 This kind of legislation was successfully challenged on first
amendment grounds in the professional advertising cases. But in these
cases, the consumers' interest outweighed the state's regulatory interest
largely because of economic factors. Particularly in its language showing
concern for the poor and their access to basic needs, the Court has sug-
gested that the first and fourteenth amendment approaches are not as
distinct as once believed.
This development might concern traditionalists, who fear that the
Court may be undermining the role of the legislature. But to others, the
Court's concern for the poor may only be a reflection of the concern our
society has for the poor, and not a new constitutional approach. Still, if
the Court has made it easier to find other challenges to legislation that
would have been upheld on due process or equal protection grounds, the
effect is that a poor person who is economically burdened by a statute
will have a better chance of seeing it invalidated. To the poor who would
have received no relief from the legislature or from the traditional judicial
approach, this is a welcome development.
JOHN E. BRENGLE
See e.g., Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Stadnik v.
Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270
Md. 103, 311 A.2d 243 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272
A.2d 487 (1971).
5397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
S
2See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969). See also note 24, supra.
"Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
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